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which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury), which 
requires that the Court review the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in 
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Authorities for Standard of Review: Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt 
Lake City, 156 P.3d 806, 2007 UT 25 (Utah 2007); Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT 
16 (Utah 2001); Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 2005 UT 14 
(Utah 2005); Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996); 
Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil Company, 902 P.2d 1229, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 
26 (Utah 1995). 
2. If the trial court did err in finding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie 
showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell, whether Appellant 
demonstrated (1) that Appellant neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, of the 
facts underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of Action before the applicable 
statutes of limitation expired; or (2) that notwithstanding Appellant's actual or 
constructive knowledge of the facts underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of 
Action within the applicable limitations periods, a reasonably diligent plaintiff in 
Appellant's position would have delayed in filing its complaint until after the applicable 
statutes of limitation had expired. 
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations and the discovery 
rule are questions of law, which are reviewed for "correctness." However, the application 
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of the discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination (i.e., the point at 
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury), which 
requires that the Court review the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in 
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Authorities for Standard of Review: Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt 
Lake City, 156 P.3d 806, 2007 UT 25 (Utah 2007); Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT 
16 (Utah 2001); Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 2005 UT 14 
(Utah 2005); Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996); 
Walker Drug Company, Inc., 902 P.2d 1229, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1995). 
At first glance, the Statement of Issues contained in Appellant's Brief suggests that 
this appeal concerns only the issue set forth in Paragraph 1 above; however, the actual 
Argument set forth in Appellant *s Brief also addresses the issue set forth in Paragraph 2 
above. As such, Appellee has addressed both issues in this Brief 
Additionally, for reasons set forth below, it is appropriate to limit the issues of this 
appeal to Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, respectively, as Appellant 
has failed to set forth any grounds on which to appeal the trial court's dismissal of 
Appellant's Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud. " To the extent that it is determined that 
Appellant properly raised issues relevant to its Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud, " 
Appellee reserves the right to supplement this Brief in order to more adequately address 
that issue. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25 (2006). 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26 (2006). 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for 
specific recovery thereof... 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in 
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
All facts contained in this Statement of Facts are referenced to the proceedings 
below. The cited record of proceedings below shall be referred to in the following 
manner: 
1. References to the Record Pleadings and Entries at Numbered Pages of the 
Record Index: (R. at ). 
2. References to the Official Transcript: (T. at ). 
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A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a Memorandum Decision dated April 16, 2008, and an 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 9, 2008, both of 
which were entered by the First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Thomas L. Willmore presiding (collectively the "Order"). Generally speaking, 
the trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to bring its First, Second, Third, and Fourth 
Causes of Action against Defendant within the time allowed by law, and that each of 
those Causes of Action were, as a result, forever barred. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff originally filed its Complaint against Defendant, Floyd Veibell, on or 
about November 20, 2006. (R. at 4). Plaintiffs Complaint alleged, among other things, 
four separate Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell. (R. at 4-11). Plaintiffs First Cause 
of Action alleged "breach of fiduciary duty;" Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action alleged 
"money by false pretenses;" Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action alleged "conversion;" and 
Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action alleged "fraud." (R. at 11-13). 
In response to Plaintiffs Complaint, Mr. Veibell promptly filed a Motion to 
Dismiss generally alleging that Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action were barred 
by the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(3), that 
Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(2), and that Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action was barred by 
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the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). (R. at 129-
130). Plaintiff opposed Mr. VeibelFs Motion to Dismiss and filed, among other things, a 
Rule 56(f) Motion requesting that the trial court continue the matter until the parties had 
conducted discovery relative to the issues raised in Mr. Veibell's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 
at 148). Pursuant to a Memorandum Decision dated February 21, 2007, the trial court 
found that Mr. Veibell's Motion to Dismiss contained facts which were outside the 
pleadings, converted said motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and allowed the parties to conduct discovery pertaining to 
the applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 167). 
Upon completion of discovery, the parties' filed their respective supplemental 
briefing as allowed by the trial court, and submitted the matter to the trial court for 
decision. (R. at 301-441). On November 29, 2007, the trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In the instant matter, the Court notes that conspicuously 
absent from [Plaintiffs] pleadings is any assertation by 
[Plaintiff] that it discovered the alleged wrongdoing, or 
discovered enough facts to cause [Plaintiff] to make further 
inquiry, on a specific date. While [Plaintiff] claims, as noted 
above, that they discovered or became aware of the facts 
forming the basis of the four causes of action during the 
preparation of the Complaint, it is the Court's belief that 
[Plaintiff] would have known or discovered at least some 
evidence of alleged wrongdoing, sufficient to bring the four 
causes of action, prior to the preparation of the Complaint in 
order to even begin the process of filing this suit. (R. at 447). 
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Despite this finding, the trial court granted Plaintiff an additional fourteen days 
within which to provide evidence to the trial court of the specific date on which Plaintiff 
became aware of the facts forming the basis for the lawsuit. (R. at 447). 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
On February 195 2008, after receiving Plaintiffs supplemental evidence, the trial 
court held a hearing on Mr. Veibell's pending motion to dismiss (which had appropriately 
been converted into a motion for summary judgment the previous year). (R. at 551). At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement (Id.), and 
thereafter issued another Memorandum Decision on April 16, 2008. (R. at 632). Based 
on the undisputed facts, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima 
facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell, thereby precluding 
Plaintiffs invocation of the "equitable discovery rule" and the tolling of the applicable 
statutes of limitation governing Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, 
respectively. (R. at 637). With regard to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, the trial 
court concluded based on the undisputed facts that Plaintiff knew enough, or reasonably 
should have known enough relevant facts during the years 1993 through 1997 to 
investigate a potential lawsuit against Mr. Veibell and pursue its Fourth Cause of Action 
for fraud. (R. at 638). As such, the trial court concluded that, even in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs four causes of action against Mr. Veibell were barred by 
the applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 639). The trial court thereafter entered its 
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Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 9, 2008, and 
dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint against Mr. Veibell with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 
at 643). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the years 1990 through 1998, Defendant, Floyd Veibell, served as 
the Mayor of the Town of Cornish. (R. at 121). 
2. In or about May of 1993, the Cornish Town Council approved Resolution 
93-2, the purpose of which was to "(1) provide constant supervision and administration of 
the Cornish culinary water system project through completion, (2) provide the necessary 
manpower to set up monitoring and recording procedures for new water quality 
requirements mandated by congress and administered by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and (3) develop a Drinking Water Source Protection Plan as required by new 
State of Utah regulations" (the "Water Project"). (R. at 5, 121-122; 440). 
3. In or about May of 1993, Mr. Veibell was appointed by the Cornish Town 
Council as the head of the Water Project. (R. at 5; 122). This job required that Mr. 
Veibell engage in a variety of administrative activities. (R. at 331). As compensation for 
this additional responsibility, Mr. Veibell5 s annual salary was increased by $10,000 for 
the year 1993. (R. at 5; 122; 440). 
4. In or about 1993, at the approximate time Resolution 93-2 was passed, Mr. 
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Veibell was also being paid by the Town for other work he was performing for the Town 
as an independent subcontractor. (R. at 350; 420-421). 
5. Shortly after Resolution 93-2 was passed, while attending a meeting which 
took place during approximately August or September of 1993, Mr. Veibell was asked by 
a representative of Farmers Home Administration (who was involved in the Water 
Project) to serve as the project inspector on the Water Project for $15.00 per hour, in 
addition to his other administrative duties as the head of the Water Project for which he 
received a $10,000 increase in his annual salary. (R. at 418). Representatives from the 
Drinking Water Board were present at this meeting, as were representatives from Hansen, 
Allen & Luce (the Water Project engineer). (Id). In response to this request, Mr. Veibell 
agreed to serve as the project inspector on an independent contactor basis. (R. at 419). 
6. On October 14, 1993, during a regular meeting of the Cornish Town 
Council, Dale Buxton (who was then serving as the Town Treasurer) reported that Mr. 
Veibell had been hired as the project inspector on the Water Project, and that he was 
going to be paid by the Town as an independent contractor with respect to those duties. 
(R. at 419; 360-361). At this point in time, the Town had already appointed Mr. Veibell 
as head of the Water Project, and authorized the $10,000 increase in his annual salary. 
(R. at 5; 122; 440). 
7. During the years 1993 through 1997, Mr. Veibell submitted expense 
vouchers in various amounts for services he had performed in connection with his 
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inspection duties on the Water Project, and Mr. Veibell was compensated for the services 
he had provided. (R. at 122). The Town agreed that Mr. Veibell was to submit vouchers 
directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce) who would then submit the 
vouchers to Farmers Home Administration and the Drinking Water Board for approval. 
(R. at 422-423). Mr. Veibell was under no obligation to submit any vouchers directly to 
the Town, and the town never requested that he do so. {Id). 
8. As was the customary practice, all records for the Town of Cornish, 
including records and vouchers pertaining to the Water Project, were kept at the home of 
Mr. Veibell. (R. at 179). Certain records may also have been stored at the homes of other 
members of the Town Council. {Id.). 
9. On or about February 9, 1995, the Cornish Town Council held another of its 
regular meetings, during which the Town Council discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had 
been hired by the Town to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour from the 
beginning of the Water Project to its end. (R. at 363). 
10. Sometime during the year 1995, Dyer Pitcher, who was serving as a 
councilman for the town of Cornish at the time, called an informal meeting of Town 
Council members at his home. (R. at 299-300; 374). The purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss Mr. Veibell's involvement in the Water Project, particularly the $15.00 per hour 
payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell in connection with the same. (R. at 374; 
300). Because this was an informal meeting, no minutes were taken (R. at 300; 374); 
-13 -
however, those council members who were present specifically discussed the fact that Mr. 
Veibell was being paid $15.00 per hour in addition to the $10,000 increase in his annual 
salary for the year 1993. (R. at 300). 
11. At some point during the informal Town Council meeting at Dyer Pitcher's 
home, Mr. Veibell was invited to the meeting, and was questioned by the Town Council 
members regarding the Council's various concerns, including his involvement in the 
Water Project, his role as mayor, and the $15.00 per hour payments that he was receiving 
in addition to his $10,000 salary increase. (R. at 300; 374). 
12. During the year 1997, certain Town Council members began to, once again, 
question the appropriateness of the payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell in 
connection with the Water Project. (R. at 568; 10). 
13. In pursuit of these concerns, the Town Council contacted the Cache County 
Attorney, Scott Wyatt, complained about the payments being made to Mr. Veibell, and 
accused Mr. Veibell of criminal conduct. (R. at 568; 426). During Scott Wyatt's 
involvement, Mr. Wyatt was informed by Mr. Veibell (or possibly others) that Mr. 
Veibell had been paid $15.00 per hour by the Town as an independent contractor in 
addition to the compensation he received in connection with his other duties and work on 
the Water Project. (R. at 574-575). 
14. As was the customary practice, the matter was referred by Scott Wyatt to 
the Cache County Sheriffs Office, who was asked to conduct an investigation to 
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determine whether Mr. Veibell had, in fact, engaged in any type of unlawful or criminal 
conduct. (R. at 10; 569). The Cache County Sheriffs Office; however, transferred the 
matter to the Utah Attorney General's Office who ultimately conducted the investigation 
of Mr. Veibell. (R. at 569; 393). 
15. As part of the investigation, Brad Blair, who had been asked to investigate 
the matter on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, visited Mr. Veibell at his home, 
and questioned him regarding his involvement in the Water Project. (R. at 427). During 
this meeting, Mr. Veibell answered Mr. Blair's questions, and provided Mr. Blair with the 
identities of other persons who had additional information concerning the subject matter 
of the investigation. (R. at 427). Mr. Blair also informed Mr. Veibell during this meeting 
that he had previously spoken with several other individuals and entities as part of the 
investigation. (R. at 427). Mr. Blair may also have met with other members of the Town 
Council itself. (R. at 427). 
16. The Appellant incorrectly avers, under the Statement of Facts section of its 
appellate brief, that Mr. Veibell withheld material information from the Cache County 
Attorney that could have been used as part of the investigation, including the fact that he 
was being paid $15.00 per hour for inspection work in addition to the $10,000 salary 
increase. (See Brief of Appellant at Pages 6 and 9). This allegation of fact is asserted for 
the first time only after the Notice of Appeal was filed. However, there is no evidence in 
the Record to support any such assertion. In fact, the portions of the Record to which the 
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Town refers in support of this allegation show only that Mr. Veibell does not specifically 
recall much of what was disclosed or discussed with Brad Blair, Scott Wyatt, or any other 
person involved in the 1997 investigation. (R. at 316; 340-342; 427-428). 
17. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Utah Attorney General's Office 
contacted Scott Wyatt and informed him that there was no evidence that Mr. Veibell had 
committed any wrongdoing, and that Mr. Veibell's conduct appeared to be appropriate. 
(R. at 570). 
18. After being informed of the results of the investigation by the Attorney 
General's Office, Scott Wyatt had a conversation with Mr. Veibell wherein he explained 
to Mr. Veibell that there was no evidence of wrongdoing or criminal intent, and that the 
matter would be dismissed without further action. (R. at 564; 570). 
19. After discussing the matter with Scott Wyatt, Mr. Veibell requested that 
Scott Wyatt memorialize the results of the investigation in writing so that Mr. Veibell 
would have a personal record of the same. (R. at 427; 570). 
20. Scott Wyatt agreed with Mr. VeibelPs request, and mailed Mr. Veibell a 
letter dated May 5, 1997 which stated, in pertinent part, as follows: 
As you know a town council member, apparently in good 
faith, complained to me that you were inappropriately 
converting municipal funds to your use. I asked that the 
matter be investigated by the Sheriffs office who apparently 
transferred the case to the Attorney General's office. The 
A.G. investigator reported back to me that, at the conclusion 
of his investigation, he could find no evidence of any wrong 
doing on your part - that in fact everything appeared 
-16-
appropriate to him. (R. at 393). 
21. On or about May 8, 1997, the Cornish Town Council held another of its 
regular meetings. (R. at 369-372). At this meeting, the Town Council, once again, 
discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the Town to inspect the water 
system for $15.00 per hour during the ongoing construction. (R. at 370). The Council 
also discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell's salary had been increased by an additional 
$10,000 as compensation for the work that he had provided in connection with the Water 
Project. (R. at 371). The Council also discussed the investigation that had been 
completed by the Attorney General's Office, and the letter written by Scott Wyatt 
concerning the results of that investigation was read aloud to all who were present. (R. at 
371). 
22. On or about November 20, 2006, approximately nine years after the 
Attorney General's investigation of Mr. Veibell had been completed, the Town filed its 
Complaint against Mr. Veibell with the First District Court in Cache County, Utah. (R. at 
4). 
23. The Town's Complaint alleged four separate causes of action against Mr. 
Veibell, all of which were based on Mr. Veibell being paid $15.00 per hour as an 
independent contractor on the Water Project in addition to the $10,000 increase in his 
salary. (R. at 12-14). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Town has failed to make a prima facie showing of affirmative 
fraudulent concealment on the part of Mr. Veibell. During all relevant time periods, the 
Town had full knowledge that Mr. Veibell submitted his $15.00 per hour payment 
vouchers directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce) rather than to the 
Town Council itself. The Town was also aware that Mr. Veibell maintained various 
records (including records pertaining to the Water Project) at his home, as was the 
customary practice at the time. The Town has always had the right to review those 
records, and Mr. Veibell took no action to prevent any such review from taking place. 
Finally, the Town has failed to prove that Mr. Veibell engaged in any type of concealment 
during the course of his criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Office or 
otherwise. For these reasons, the trial court did not err by finding that the Town failed to 
make a prima facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment necessary to toll the 
applicable statutes of limitations. 
2. Even if the Town were to have made a prima facie showing of affirmative 
fraudulent concealment, the Town knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts 
underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of Action before the fixed limitations 
periods expired; and, a reasonably diligent plaintiff in the Town's position would not 
have delayed the filing of its complaint until November 20, 2006. Under the facts of this 
case, the Town Council knew, as early as October of 1993, that Mr. Veibell was being 
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paid $15.00 per hour in addition to receiving a $10,000 increase in his annual salary for 
his duties related to the Water Project. During 1995 and 1997, the Town Council held 
several meetings where these issues were discussed at length, and a criminal investigation 
of Mr. Veibell was conducted by the Attorney General's Office during 1997. Based on 
the information that was available to the Town, the Town knew (or reasonably should 
have known) of the facts underlying its claims prior to November 20, 2006, and any 
reasonably diligent plaintiff in the Town's position would have pursued its claims prior to 
that point in time. As such, each of the Town's Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell 
were properly dismissed. 
3. Because the statute of limitations that is applicable to the Town's Fourth 
Cause of Action against Mr. Veibell contains a "statutory discovery rule," the "equitable 
discovery rule" argued by the Town in support of its Fourth Cause of Action does not 
apply. Therefore, the Town's failure to assert any alternative issue with regard to the 
dismissal of its Fourth Cause of Action precludes this Court from overturning the trial 
court's ruling on that issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TOWN 
FAILED TO SATISFY THE "FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
DOCTRINE" WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND, AND 
THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION. 
In this case, the Town's First, Second, and Third Causes of Action were each 
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dismissed for not being filed within the time allowed by law. Generally speaking, a 
statute of limitations begins to run "upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 
741 (Utah 2005). Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2005); Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake 
City, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007). Once a statute of limitations has begun to run, a plaintiff 
must file his or her claims before the limitations period expires; otherwise, the claim will 
be forever barred. Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746. "Mere ignorance of the existence of 
a cause of action will neither prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a 
plaintiffs failure to file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Id. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
existence of the so-called "discovery rule," which contains two "narrow" settings where a 
statute of limitations may be tolled until the discovery of facts forming the basis for a 
particular cause of action. Id. The first setting in which the "discovery rule" applies 
involves situations where a relevant statute of limitations, by its own terms, mandates 
application of the discovery rule (i.e., the "statutory discovery rule").1 Id.; see also 
Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 810; Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. The second setting in which the 
"discovery rule" may operate to toll a relevant statute of limitations involves situations 
1 "An example of a statutory discovery rule is found in the three-year statute of limitations governing claims based 
on fraud or mistake, which provides that a cause of action will not accrue 'until the discovery by the aggrieved party 
of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002)." Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 
746. 
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where a particular statute of limitations provides only a fixed limitations period with no 
"statutory discovery rule" exception.2 Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746. This second 
scenario is commonly referred to as the "equitable discovery rule," and it applies only in 
the following two situations: (1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of 
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (2) where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust. Id. The first of these two scenarios is commonly known as the 
"concealment" or "fraudulent concealment" doctrine. The second of these two scenarios 
is commonly known as the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine. However, because the 
Town has failed to raise any issue pertaining to the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine 
in this appeal, it is only the "fraudulent concealment" version of the discovery rule that is 
presently at issue. 
A. Application Of The "Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine". 
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action are 
governed by the four-year statute of limitations period set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 
78-12-25 (2006). It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action is governed 
by the three-year statute of limitations period set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-
26 (2006). Because neither of the foregoing statutes of limitation contain a "statutory 
discovery rule," and because Plaintiff has failed to raise any issue involving the 
2 An example of a statute of limitations that does not mandate application of the discovery rule is the four-year 
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"exceptional circumstances'9 doctrine on appeal, the "fraudulent concealment" version of 
the discovery rule is the only applicable doctrine presently at issue. See Russell Packard, 
108 P.3d at 746; see also FOOTNOTE 2 above. 
Generally speaking, all that is required to trigger the running of a statute of 
limitations is sufficient information to apprise the plaintiff of the underlying cause of 
action, so as to put the plaintiff on notice to make further inquiry if the plaintiff harbors 
doubts or questions about the defendant's conduct. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. However, 
under the "fraudulent concealment doctrine," the running of a statute of limitations may 
be tolled if (1) a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action; and (2) such lack 
of awareness is the result of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct. 
Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 816; Russell Packard, 108 P.3d 741; see also Berenda, 914 P.2d at 
51. The Utah Supreme Court has held that in order to toll a statute of limitations under 
the "fraudulent concealment doctrine," a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing 
that a defendant's actions amounted to fraudulent concealment. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51; 
Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2005). Utah case law suggests that a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment requires proof that a defendant actually 
took "affirmative steps" to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 
5\;see Robinson v. Morrow, 99 P.3d 341 (Utah App. 2004); see Rappleye v. Rappleye, 
99 P.3d 348 (Utah App. 2004); see Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 2001). However, if 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2006). See Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746. 
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the facts underlying a plaintiffs allegations of fraudulent concealment are tenuous, 
vague, or otherwise insufficient, then the plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law. Russell 
Packard, 108 P.3dat 751. 
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment, he 
must next demonstrate either (1) that the plaintiff neither knew, nor reasonably should 
have known, of the facts underlying his cause of action before the fixed limitations period 
expired; or (2) that notwithstanding the plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the 
facts underlying his or her cause of action within the limitations period, a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff may have delayed in filing his complaint until after the statute of 
limitations expired. Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 816; Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 748; 
Charlesworth, 113 P.3dat 1036-1037. 
Even though cases of this nature are highly fact-dependent, plaintiffs cannot 
"avoid summary judgment simply by asserting that it would have been futile for them to 
inquire about potential claims." Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 817. Rather, plaintiffs who have 
knowledge of underlying facts must reasonably investigate their claims in order to rely on 
the "fraudulent concealment doctrine/5 and a defendant's "mere silence in the face of a 
plaintiffs failure to use reasonable diligence in investigating a claim is insufficient 
evidence of fraudulent concealment to warrant tolling the statute of limitations." Id. at 
817-818. Essentially, before a plaintiff may rely on the "fraudulent concealment 
doctrine," he must have actually made an attempt to investigate his claim, and that 
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attempt must have been rendered futile as a result of the defendant's fraudulent or 
misleading conduct. Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 817. In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to 
satisfy the foregoing legal standard. 
(i) The Town Has Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing of Affirmative Fraudulent 
Concealment on the Part of Mr. Veibell. 
The Town would have this Court believe that Mr. Veibell has taken affirmative 
steps to conceal his alleged fraud, or that Mr. Veibell failed to make a full disclosure of 
material information in violation of his fiduciary responsibilities. {See Brief of Appellant 
at Pagel 1-13). These assertions are unsubstantiated by verified facts submitted in 
consideration of summary judgment. As such, the Town has failed to satisfy the first 
prong of the "fraudulent concealment doctrine." 
For example, the Town claims in defense of the dismissal that "Mayor Veibell did 
not have the vouchers for his $15.00 per hour work approved by the Town Council as 
were other Town bills." {See Brief of Appellant at Page 13). This was not the case, and 
was not duly presented for summary judgment consideration. Rather, the undisputed fact 
is that the Town explicitly agreed during a Town Council meeting that Mr. Veibell was to 
submit vouchers directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce), who 
would then submit them to Farmers Home Administration and the Drinking Water Board 
for approval. (R. at 422-423). The trial record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary, 
and no evidence was presented for summary judgment consideration to suggest that the 
Town ever requested or required that Mr. Veibell submit each individual voucher directly 
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to the Town itself. For all practical purposes, Mr. Veibell's invoices were scrutinized as 
directed by the Town at three separate intervals by three separate entities (i.e., the project 
engineer, Farmers Home Administration, and the Drinking Water Board) before any 
payment was ever issued. What is more, not one entity involved in that multi-level 
review process made any allegation of fraud or misconduct against Mr. Veibell, and the 
Town knowingly authorized this process to continue without objection. For the Town to 
claim on appeal that it had no knowledge of these transactions, or that Mr. Veibell was 
violating some valid rule or procedure, without supplying any reliable evidence in support 
of such assertions is untenable and improper. 
To further cast doubt on the trial court's decision, the Town would have this Court 
believe that "Mayor Veibell was careful to have the payments for his [alleged] double-
dipping sent to his home rather than to the Town offices." (See Brief of Appellant at Page 
13). However, the undisputed facts show that Mr. Veibell's work was not duplicitous or 
"double dipping." Moreover, what the Town has conspicuously failed to disclose is the 
fact that all records for the Town of Cornish, including records and payment vouchers 
pertaining to the Water Project, were by common consent and practice and for the 
convenience of the Town kept at the home of the mayor, and possibly other members of 
the Town Council. (R. at 179). The Town Council was aware of this customary 
arrangement, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. Appellant did 
not present any fact on summary judgment showing that the Town made a request to 
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review the records being maintained at Mr. Veibell's home prior to this lawsuit, or that 
Mr. Veibell took action to prevent the Town from doing so. For the Town to now, on 
appeal, misconstrue Mr. Veibell's custody of these documents as an attempt to 
fraudulently conceal incriminating evidence is also improper. Despite its accusations on 
appeal, the Town has had full knowledge of the location of all records pertaining to the 
Water Project since the Project's inception, and Mr. Veibell is not to be blamed for the 
Town's failure to review or inspect those records in response to its suspicions during 
1993, 1995, and 1997. 
Similarly, the Town has argued that Mr. Veibell "concealed the whole story from 
the County Attorney" and that Mr. Veibell's conduct during the Attorney General's 
investigation was "particularly reprehensible" and made "the Town's further delay 
unquestionably reasonable." (See Brief of Appellant at Page 14-15). But these arguments 
are unsupported by the undisputed facts presented to the trial court for purposes of 
summary judgment. More specifically, the Town incorrectly avers that Mr. Veibell 
withheld material information from the Cache County Attorney that could have been used 
as part of the investigation, including the fact that he was being paid $15.00 per hour for 
inspection work in addition to the $10,000 salary increase. (See Brief of Appellant at 
Page 6 and 9). However, the portions of the Record to which the Town refers show only 
that Mr. Veibell does not specifically recall much of what was discussed or disclosed 
during the investigation (which is not implausible given the amount of time that has 
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passed since those events transpired). (R. at 316; 340-342; 427-428). The Record also 
reflects that Brad Blair (who was investigating the matter on behalf of the Attorney 
General and the County Attorney) visited Mr. Veibell at his home, and questioned him 
extensively regarding his involvement in the Water Project. (R. at 426-427). During this 
meeting, Mr. Veibell answered Mr. Blair's questions, and even provided Mr. Blair with 
the identities of other persons who had additional information concerning the subject 
matter of the investigation. {Id). These are not the actions of a person who is attempting 
to conceal facts, and the Town has supplied no disputation of fact to suggest that the 
information provided by Mr. Veibell was anything less than the entire truth. In fact, Mr. 
Blair probably even met with other members of the Town Council in connection with his 
investigation (R. at 427), which would have only given the Town further opportunity to 
assert and investigate its concerns and refute any inaccurate disclosures by Mr. Veibell. 
By itself, the Town's vague accusation that Mr. Veibell fraudulently concealed 
evidence during the 1997 investigation may be convenient for purposes of the Town's 
appeal, but is entirely unsupported by the trial Record. Furthermore, the fact that Mr. 
Veibell stood in a fiduciary capacity to the Town does not, by itself, overcome the statute 
of limitations. Under law, a fiduciary may have a duty to "speak the truth," but there is no 
evidence in the Record to suggest that Mr. Veibell has done anything to the contrary, nor 
is there any evidence in the Record to suggest that Mr. Veibell undertook any intentional 
actions to conceal the payments which he received or the conduct in which he engaged. 
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As a whole, after many opportunities to do so, the Town has failed to evidence any 
singularly identifiable act of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell; thus the 
Town failed to make di prima facie showing. That being the case, the various causes of 
action asserted by the Town against Mr. Veibell were all properly dismissed by the trial 
court. 
(ii) Even if the Town were to have Made a Prima Facie Showing of Affirmative 
Fraudulent Concealment, the Town has Failed to Satisfy the Second Prong of the 
"Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine". 
Despite its failure to do so, but assuming, arguendo, that the Town satisfied the 
first prong of the "fraudulent concealment doctrine" by making di prima facie showing of 
affirmative fraudulent concealment on the part of Mr. Veibell, there is simply no valid or 
plausible reason why the Town of Cornish could not have pursued its claims against Mr. 
Veibell within the time fixed by law. During May of 1993, Mr. Veibell was appointed by 
the Cornish Town Council as the head of the Water Project. (R. at 5; 122). In 
conjunction with those responsibilities, Mr. Veibell's annual salary was increased by 
$10,000. (R. at 5; 122; 440). Several months later, on October 14, 1993, the Town 
Treasurer reported (during a regular meeting of the Cornish Town Council) that Mr. 
Veibell had also been hired as the project inspector on the Water Project, and that he was 
going to receive additional compensation from the Town as an independent contractor 
with respect to those duties. (R. at 419; 360-361). Thus, as early as October of 1993, the 
Town Council was on notice that Mr. Veibell was serving in two capacities with respect 
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to the Water Project. Mr. Veibell has also demonstrated that these two positions were 
separate and distinct. 
On February 9, 1995, the Town Council held another of its regular meetings, 
during which the Town Council discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the 
Town to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour in addition to his duties as head of 
the Water Project. (R. at 363). At another point during the year 1995, Dyer Pitcher, who 
was then serving as a member of the Town Council, called an informal meeting of Town 
Council members at his home. (R. at 299-300; 374). The purpose of this unofficial 
meeting was to discuss Mr. Veibell's involvement in the Water Project, with particular 
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Veibell was being paid $15.00 per hour for his inspection 
duties in addition to the compensation he had received as head of the Water Project. (R. 
at 300; 374). Mr. Veibell was even invited 1o this informal meeting, and questioned by 
the Council members regarding the Council's various concerns. {Id). Thus, the Town 
Council was aware that Mr. Veibell was being paid for two separate duties in relation to 
the Water Project as far back as February 9, 1995; the Town Council discussed Mr. 
Veibell's involvement and compensation on numerous occasions during the year 1995; 
and, the Town Council had the opportunity to personally question Mr. Veibell in detail 
about his conduct during that same year. Despite the Town's knowledge of Mr. Veibell's 
involvement, and its obvious opportunity to take further investigative and remedial action, 
the Town Council did nothing. 
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Later, during the year 1997, certain Town Council members began to, once again, 
question the propriety of the payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell. (R. at 10; 
568). In pursuit of these concerns, members of the Town Council contacted the Cache 
County Attorney, Scott Wyatt, complained about the payments being made to Mr. 
Veibell, and accused Mr. Veibell of criminal conduct. (R. at 426; 568). The Town 
Council then requested that Mr. Wyatt conduct an investigation to determine whether Mr. 
Veibell had, in fact, committed any criminal wrongdoing. (R. at 10; 569). In response, 
Mr. Wyatt ultimately transferred the matter to the Utah Attorney General's Office, who 
conducted an investigation of Mr. Veibell. (R. at 393; 569). 
On or about May 8, 1997, the Town Council held another of its regular meetings 
and, once again, discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the Town to inspect 
the water system for $15.00 per hour during the ongoing construction. (R. at 369-372). 
During this meeting, the Council also discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had received a 
$10,000 increase in his salary as compensation for his duties as head of the Water Project. 
(Id.). Those present at the meeting also discussed the results of the Attorney General's 
criminal investigation of Mr. Veibell. (Id.). Despite the various meetings, discussions, 
and other events that had previously transpired, the Town took no further action on the 
matter until the filing of this lawsuit nearly nine and one-half years later. 
Based upon the foregoing, there is no justifiable excuse for the Town's failure to 
pursue this case within the applicable periods of limitation. The Town Council was 
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aware of Mr. Veibell's salary increase and additional hourly compensation as far back as 
October of 1993. The Town Council continued to discuss the issue, and even questioned 
Mr. Veibell regarding these payments, throughout the year 1995, and the Town further 
discussed the matter and submitted it to the Utah Attorney General's Office for further 
investigation during the year 1997. The information known to the Town during 1997 
(and prior thereto) was sufficient to timely file suit and bring these claims against Mr. 
Veibell. Moreover, it is nonsensical for the Town to have suspected criminal wrongdoing 
on the part of Mr. Veibell from 1993 through 1997, and to have instigated a criminal 
investigation of Mr. Veibell during 1997, only to have simultaneously taken no civil 
action to remedy the situation and recover the amounts, if any, that Mr. Veibell had, 
allegedly, wrongfully misappropriated. If the Town had enough information to pursue 
criminal charges during 1997, then it certainly had enough information to pursue civil 
charges at that same point in time, especially given the fact that the Town's criminal 
accusations would have required a far more stringent burden of proof than its civil 
concerns. 
Mr. Veibell has denied any wrongdoing whatsoever. However, under the plain and 
undisputed facts of this case, the Town of Cornish undoubtedly had enough information 
to at least file suit and pursue each of its Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell as far back 
as 1993, but certainly no later than May of 1997. Under the circumstances, the Town 
should have filed its Complaint against Mr. Veibell by no later than May 8, 2001 (i.e., 
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four years after the May 8, 1997 Town Council Meeting). Accordingly, the Town should 
be held accountable for its own negligence, and Mr. Veibell should not have been forced 
to bear the burden of this defense nearly fifteen years after the commencement of his 
duties with regard to the Water Project. 
II. THE TOWN'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MR. VEIBELL 
FOR "FRAUD" HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY APPEALED, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF SAID CLAIM CANNOT BE 
ADDRESSED OR OVERTURNED. 
It appears from the language of Appellant's Brief that the Town is appealing the 
trial court's decision with regard to each of its respective Causes of Action, including its 
Fourth Cause of Action alleging "fraud." The Town's appeal is based, entirely, on the 
premise that the Town has satisfied the requirements of the "fraudulent concealment 
doctrine." In making this argument, the Town impliedly and expressly asserts that the 
"fraudulent concealment doctrine" applies to each of its respective Causes of Action, 
including its Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud." More specifically, the Town claims that 
the "Trial Court erroneously concluded that the fraudulent concealment branch of the 
discovery rule did not apply to Cornish Town's fraud claim because of the statutory 
discovery provision with regard to fraud." {See Brief of Appellant at Page 15). Despite 
these assertions, and the Town's misguided reliance on the case of Berenda v. Langford, 
the "fraudulent concealment" branch of the "equitable discovery rule" does not apply to 
the Town's Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud." 
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In the more recent Russell Packard case, the Utah Supreme Court clarified prior 
case law and emphasized that the "equitable discovery rule," including the "fraudulent 
concealment doctrine," apply only where a statute of limitations does not, by its own 
terms, already account for such circumstances (i.e., where a statute of limitations lacks a 
"statutory discovery rule"). Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 747. The Court specifically 
held that "it would be inappropriate to apply the concealment version of the discovery 
rule in the context of the three-year statute of limitations for fraud" contained in Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). Id. As pari of this clarification, the Supreme Court 
specifically modified its prior holding in Berenda (the case on which the Town relies), 
which had suggested that the "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances" versions of 
the "equitable discovery rule" may apply even where a statute of limitations contains a 
statutory discovery rule. Id. 
The Town's Fourth Cause of Action against Mr. Veibell was dismissed based on 
the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-
26(3)(2006), which contains an internal "statutory discovery rule." (R. at 637-639). As 
such, the Town's generalized appeal based on the "fraudulent concealment doctrine" 
cannot be applied to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud." Because the Town 
has failed to assert an alternative ground for appeal with regard to its Fourth Cause of 
Action, said Cause of Action is not at issue, and this Court cannot address or overturn the 
trial court's dismissal of the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Veibell respectfully requests that the May 9, 2008 
Order entered by the trial court in this case be upheld and affirmed, and that the relief 
requested in Appellant's appeal be denied. Mr. Veibell also respectfully requests an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
2f> DATED this l_ day of November, 2008. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
J.Fife 
Jonathan R. Palmer 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
TOWN OF CORNISH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060102639 
FLOYD VEIBELL, 
Defendant. 
On or about December 12,2006, Defendant filed aMotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint 
based upon Defendant's position that the statutes of limitations had run on all of Plaintiff s claims. 
Defendant Motion to Dismiss was subsequently converted by the Court into a motion for summary 
judgment. Thereafter the parties engaged in discovery and submitted supplemental memoranda to 
the Court. A hearing was also held on Defendant's converted Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 19, 2008. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement 
and issued its Decision granting Defendant's converted Motion for Summary Judgment on April 16, 
2008. 
For the reason's set forth in the Court's April 16, 2008 Decision, Defendant's converted 
Motion for Summary Judgment is herby granted and Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant is 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
£> 
-Mo 
J \KJF\PleadmdY 
DATED this *T day of Aprrg2008. 
fuage Thomas L. Willmore 
AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 2(*~ day of April, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to the following: 
Blake S. Atkin 
William O. Kimball 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
136 South Main, Suite A401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to 
this ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT is submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after 
service, the original will be filed with the Court for signature. 
Kevin J. Fife 
veibell, FloydWeibell order def summary judgment doc 
/ /IjJ 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF CORNISH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FLOYD VEIBELL, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Civil No. 060102639 
Judge: Thomas L. Willmore 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Floyd Veibell's 
(hereinafter "Defendant" or "Veibell") Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 
19, 2008. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed the Defendant's Motions and 
Memoranda in Support, Plaintiffs Memoranda in Opposition, Defendant's Replies in Support, 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in 
Support, Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Statute of 
Limitations, the Court's Memorandum Decisions dated February 21, 2007 and November 29, 
2007, respectively, each document and affidavit submitted before the Court, and the applicable 
case law and statutory provisions. A hearing was also held on Defendant's Mtf/cw to Dismiss on 
February 19, 2008. Following the hearing, Plaintiff submitted an unsolicited Supplemental 
Memorandum in Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008 with 
supporting affidavits. As noted above, Defendant responded with & Motion to Strike the 
unsolicited Memorandum which is also now before the Court. Having considered the foregoing, 
the Court issues this Decision. 
I. Defendant Floyd Veibell's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in 
Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19\ 2008. 
Following the February 19, 2008 hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff 
Town of Cornish (hereinafter "Cornish" or "Plaintiff') filed an unsolicited Memorandum in 
1 
Response to questions the Court propounded to Plaintiff during the hearing and to which Plaintiff 
felt it was "not able to give ... complete answers on the spur of the moment." As noted above, the 
Court did not request additional briefing on the questions asked at the hearing and the Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not allow an unsolicited Memorandum to be filed. Plaintiff cites two cases 
where post-hearing supplemental briefings were considered by the trial court; however, in both 
cases, the trial courts had requested such briefing from the parties. Here, Plaintiff had more than 
one year to conduct discovery and submit any evidence it felt was sufficient to support its case, 
either in its several supplemental memoranda filed prior to the hearing or at the hearing. 
Furthermore, the Court extended the original discovery period at Plaintiffs request, see 
Memorandum Decision, dated February 21, 2007, and allowed Plaintiff an additional two weeks 
to provide the Court with very specific evidence relating to Defendant'sMtf/arc to Dismiss prior 
to the hearing. {See Memorandum Decision, dated November 29, 2007.) 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided with sufficient time to prepare for 
the hearing on Defendant' § Motion to Dismiss and to provide the Court with any evidence it felt 
was relevant. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed to set forth good cause sufficient to justify 
review of the unsolicited Memorandum. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's Morion to 
Strike and will not consider Plaintiffs unsolicited Supplemental Memorandum in Response to 
Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008. 
II. Defendant Floyd Veibell'SM^ZOA? to Dismiss. 
On or about December 12, 2006, Defendant Floyd Veibell filed & Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Complaint. However, as has noted by the Court in its prior Decisions, since both 
parties have submitted evidence outside of the pleadings, the Court will treat the Motion to 
Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In the instant matter, Floyd Veibell served as the Mayor of the Town of Cornish during 
the years 1990 through 1998. In 1993, the Cornish Town Council approved Resolution 93-2, the 
purpose of which was to "(1) provide constant supervision and administration of the Cornish 
culinary water system project through completion, (2) provide the necessary manpower to set up 
monitoring and recording procedures for new water quality requirements mandated by Congress 
and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, and (3) develop a Drinking Water 
2 
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Source Protection Plan as required by new State of Utah regulations [hereinafter known as the 
"Water Project"]." (Compl. at ffif 6-7.) In 1993, Defendant Veibell was appointed by the Town 
Council to manage the Water Project and his annual salary was increased by $10,000.00 as 
compensation for the added responsibility. In addition to the increase in salary however, Plaintiff 
alleges that Veibell was also being paid $15.00 per hour by the Town of Cornish for other work 
he was performing for Cornish as an independent sub-contractor on the same Water Project. 
Cornish alleges that Veibell never disclosed to the Town Council that he was being paid twice for 
the same work. 
Plaintiff alleges that during the years 1993 through 1997, Veibell submitted expense 
vouchers in various amounts for services he claimed to have performed relating to the Water 
Project. However, none of the vouchers or payments were presented to the Town Council for 
approval and after the Water Project was completed in 1994, Defendant Veibell allegedly 
continued to submit expense vouchers for the next three years relating to work on the completed 
Water Project. The Town of Cornish claims that not only was Veibell paid twice by Cornish to 
complete the Water Project, but he never completed the Water Project himself, paying a third 
party approximately $9,000.00 out of city funds to complete it. Finally, between 1993 and 1997, 
the record shows that there were discussions involving the Town Council or members therefrom 
regarding concerns about Veibell and his involvement in the Water Project; furthermore, in 1997, 
the Attorney General's Office conducted a criminal investigation of Veibell's conduct and found 
no evidence of wrongdoing. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt, County Attorney, Cache County, 
Utah, to C. Floyd Veibell, Mayor, Town of Cornish (May 5, 1997). 
The Town of Cornish took no further action until it filed its Complaint on November 17, 
2006. Veibell, shortly thereafter, moved to dismiss the Complaint arguing that Cornish's four 
alleged causes of action—(1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) money by false pretenses; (3) 
conversion; and (4) fraud—are all barred by their applicable statutes of limitations. Veibell argues 
that the four year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-25(3) 
governs and bars Cornish's first and second causes of action for "breach of fiduciary duty" and 
"money by false pretenses," respectively. Cornish claims in response that the applicable statute of 
limitations for its first and second causes of action has been tolled by the "(equitable) discovery 
rule," aflfirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell, and exceptional circumstances. Veibell next 
argues that Cornish's third cause of action for "conversion" is governed and barred by the three 
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year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26. Cornish again argues 
that the statute of limitations is tolled by the "(equitable) discovery rule" as well as concealment 
and affirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell. Finally, Veibell argues that Cornish's fourth 
cause of action for "fraud" is barred by the three year statute of limitation set forth in UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3). In response, Cornish claims that the fraud statute's internal 
"discovery rule" operates to toll the statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). 
Mr. Veibell claims that all of the above-noted statute of limitations began to run, at the 
latest, in either 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 or 2001; thereby, barring Cornish's four causes of action 
which were all filed in 2006. Cornish however argues that the applicable statutes of limitations 
have been tolled as the facts forming the basis for the cause of action were not and could not have 
been discoverable until the preparation of the Complaint in this case, even after reasonable 
diligence and inquiry. Furthermore, Cornish alleges that Veibell intentionally withheld information 
(i.e., during the 1997 criminal investigation finding no evidence of wrongdoing) that would have 
otherwise enabled Cornish to have discovered the alleged fraud and other causes of action in this 
case, thus invoking the "discovery rule" so as to toll the applicable statute of limitations. 
In accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "summary judgment 
is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a motion for 
summary judgment is made, the affidavit of the nonmoving party must contain "specific 
evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); see also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (holding that 
the affiant's "mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to 
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion"). 
Furthermore, "[t]o successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving 
party must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case. Failure to do so with regard to any of the essential elements of that party's claim will result 
in a conclusion that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson Dev. 
Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 332 (Utah 2005). However, "doubts or uncertainties concerning 
issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be 
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment." Webster, 675 
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P.2d at 1172; see also Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, as to application of the discovery rule in Utah, the Courts have indicated that 
the discovery rule operates to toll the statute of limitations "until the discovery of facts forming 
the basis for the cause of action." Id. Moreover, the discovery rule "operates either when 
provided for by statute (the 'statutory discovery rule') or when required by equity (the 'equitable 
discovery rule'). The statute may be tolled under the equitable discovery rule when either 
exceptional circumstances or the defendant's [affirmative] fraudulent concealment prevents the 
plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id. (citation omitted). The courts have also indicated that the 
application of the discovery rule "involves a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which 
a person reasonably should know that he has suffered a legal injury." Colosimo v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop, 156 P.3d 806, 810 (Utah 2007). Nonetheless, when the plaintiff fails to make a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment (i.e., affirmative steps), the equitable discovery 
rule cannot be invoked to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, as a matter of law, since the 
plaintiff would have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative concealment 
See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). 
Here, Cornish first seeks to toll the statutes of limitations through application of the 
"equitable discovery rule" to its first three causes of action for "breach of fiduciary duty;" "money 
under false pretenses;" and "conversion." Under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of the 
"equitable discovery rule," the statute of limitations period is tolled "where the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant... prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
Colosimo, 156P.3dat812. The Courts have held that for this exception to apply, "an initial 
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered 
the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the applicable 
limitations period]." Id (citation omitted). Next, the Courts have indicated that the fraudulent 
concealment version of the "equitable discovery rule" applies so as to toll the running of the 
limitations period when "a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct." Id (citation omitted). More specifically, in order 
for the fraudulent concealment doctrine to apply, 
fP]laintiff must demonstrate either (1) that the plaintiff neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known of the facts underlying his or her cause of action 
before the fixed limitations period expired; or (2) that notwithstanding the 
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plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the facts underlying his or her cause 
of action within the limitations period, a reasonably diligent plaintiff may have 
delayed in filing his or her complaint until after the statute of limitations expired. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Colosimo, 156P.3dat816 (citationomitted). 
Also, in Berenda v. Langford, supra, the court indicated that "when a plaintiff alleges that 
a defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action ... [as is the case here,] 
the plaintiff can avoid full operation of the discovery rule by making & prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier." Berenda, 914 P. 2d at 54 (emphasis added). 
After reviewing the parties' arguments, both in their pleadings as well as at the hearing 
held on February 19, 2008, the Court finds that the Town of Cornish has failed to make a prima 
facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Defendant Veibell. While the Town of 
Cornish alleges that Veibell's mere nondisclosure to the Attorney General's Office and members 
of the Town Council constitutes affirmative fraudulent concealment under the "equitable 
discovery rule," the courts have indicated that a plaintiff must show that affirmative steps have 
been taken to conceal, which the Court finds to be beyond the mere nondisclosure alleged in the 
present matter. See generally Berenda v. Longford, supra. Accordingly, while a determination of 
whether the Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in investigating the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs 
Complaint sufficient to toll the statute of limitations requires a subsidiary factual determination, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative 
concealment by Veibell and as a result, Plaintiffs first three causes of action fail as a matter of 
law. Id. at 54. Therefore, as a matter of law, since Plaintiff has failed to make aprima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment, the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to toll the 
applicable statutes of limitations, respectively, and as such, Plaintiffs first three causes of action 
are hereby barred. 
With respect to Cornish's fourth cause of action alleging fraud, the statutory provision of 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3) operates to toll the running of the statutory limitations 
period of three years until a plaintiff "either discovers] or should have discovered his or her cause 
of action." Colosimo, 156P.3dat811. Furthermore, concerning an action for fraud, the "plaintiff 
is deemed to have discovered his action when he has actual knowledge of the fraud cor by 
reasonable diligence and inquiry should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against 
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him [emphasis added]." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Courts have held that in such 
circumstance, "if a party has knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably 
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will run." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Here, the Cornish Town Council convened on October 14, 1993 and discussed the fact 
that Veibell was being "paid as a contractor for his work on the new system." See Minutes from 
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (October 14, 1993). On February 9, 1995, the 
Cornish Town Council again met and discussed the fact that Veibell had been "hired by the town 
to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour from project beginning to end." See Minutes from 
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (February 9, 1995); see also Memorandum re: 
Cornish Town Water System Improvements Project from William S. Bigelow, P.E. (February 9, 
1995). It also appears that during the year 1995, an informal meeting was held with Town Council 
members where Veibell's involvement in the Water Project was discussed. See Affidavit of Kelly 
Naegle, ffif 3-5; Affidavit of Dale Buxton fflf 3-6. In 1997, as noted above, the Town initiated a 
criminal investigation of Veibell regarding his involvement with the Water Project and his 
handling of public funds. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt to Mayor Veibell, supra. Finally, on May 
8, 1997, the Town Council met and discussed the issue of Veibell receiving an extra $15.00 per 
hour for his work on the Water Project. See Minutes from the Cornish Town Council Meeting, 
Cornish, Utah (May 8, 1997). 
Based on the evidence in the record and as partially noted above, it is clear to the Court 
that the Town knew enough during the years 1993 through 1997 to investigate a potential 
lawsuit. Particularly, the Court finds it quite telling that the Town had sufficient facts in 1997 to 
suspect wrongdoing and request that the Attorney General's Office conduct a criminal 
investigation. It is therefore apparent to the Court that the Town knew enough or through 
reasonable diligence should have known enough relevant facts concerning Veibell's alleged 
fraudulent conduct during the years 1993 through 1997 to have pursued a cause of action of fraud 
prior to 2000 (three years later). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). Based on the undisputed 
facts of this matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff had ample opportunity to investigate and assert 
its cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000. The Town Council could easily have requested 
and reviewed any and all pertinent financial documents and/or other relevant documents they now 
rely on in support of their claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff discovered and/or had at 
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its disposal sufficient information in 1997 to bring the present action for fraud by the year 2000 as 
it had "actual knowledge of the fraud cor by reasonable diligence and inquiry should have know, 
the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him..'" Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 811 (citation 
omitted); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). 
While Plaintiff argues that "weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light 
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause[s] of action necessitates the type of factual findings 
which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases," Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54, the 
Court finds that here, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of "affirmative" 
fraudulent concealment and as a matter of law the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to 
toll the applicable statutes of limitations. Furthermore, it is clear to the Court that the Town of 
Cornish should have reasonably known or discovered at least some evidence sufficient to bring its 
cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000 since, based on the record and the evidence set 
forth by the parties and as referenced herein, the Town should have known or at least made 
further diligent inquiry no later than 1997. 
Therefore, even in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the Town), the Court 
finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant Veibell is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant Veibell' $ Motion to 
Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, and counsel for Defendant Veibell is directed 
to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this f (p day of April, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
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